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A central  structural  point  in all DRG-based  hospital  payment  systems  is the  conversion
of  relative  weights  into  actual payments.  In  this  context  policy  makers  need  to  address
(amongst  other  things)  (a)  how  the  price  level  of  DRG-payments  from  one  period  to  the
following  period  is  changed  and  (b) whether  and  how  hospital  payments  based  on  DRGs
are to be differentiated  beyond  patient  characteristics,  e.g.  by  organizational,  regional  or
state-level  factors.  Both  policy  problems  can be and  in  international  comparison  often  are
empirically  addressed.  In  Germany  relative  weights  are  derived  from  a highly  sophisticated
empirical  cost  calculation,  whereas  the  annual  changes  of  DRG-based  payments  (base  rates)
as well  as the  differentiation  of DRG-based  hospital  payments  beyond  patient  characteris-
tics are  not  empirically  addressed.  Rather  a complex  set  of regulations  and  quasi-marketBaserate
DRG
negotiations  are  applied.  There  were  over  the last  decade  also  timid  attempts  to  foster  the
use of  empirical  data  to  address  these  points.  However,  these  reforms  failed  to increase  the
fairness,  transparency  and  rationality  of  the  mechanism  to  convert  relative  weights  into
actual  DRG-based  hospital  payments.
©  2015  The  Authors.  Published  by Elsevier  Ireland  Ltd.  This  is  an  open  access  article  under
the  CC  BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction and motivation
DRG-systems have become the most common basis for
hospital payment in European countries [1,2]. All these
countries (a) use a patient classiﬁcation system (PCS) to
group patients with similar characteristics into homoge-
nous groups with similar resource intensity [3], (b) collect
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(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).cost information to determine relative weights [4] and
(c) apply conversion mechanisms to transform relative
weights of DRGs into monetary values that are used for
payment [5]. In the context of converting relative weights
into prices, two  fundamental points need to be addressed
in the context of all DRG-based hospital payment systems.
Firstly: how has the price level of DRG-payments from
one period to the following period changed? Secondly:
whether and how hospital payments based on DRGs are
to be differentiated beyond the patient characteristics, e.g.
by organizational, regional or state factors. With regard
to these two dimensions, the development and reforms
set Germany apart from most other European and inter-
national DRG-based systems. This article focuses on the
German policy developments with regard to these two  hos-
pital ﬁnancing questions in the context of DRG-systems,
outlines implications and provides an outlook.
 access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
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. Context
In Germany the G-DRG system is the principal mecha-
ism to allocate ﬁnancial resources to hospitals. It allocates
bout 85% of ﬁnancial resources (65 billion Euros in 2013
rom the SHI-Funds) to hospitals [6], which is interna-
ionally one of the highest share of DRG-based hospital
ayment [5]. Principally, the G-DRG system applies to all
ospitals, irrespective of ownership status, and all patients
except rehabilitation and psychiatric, psychosomatic or
sychotherapeutic patients), regardless of whether or not
hey are members of the Social Health Insurance (SHI)
ystem, have private health insurance, or are self-funding
atients [7]. The DRG-based hospital payment for each case
s deﬁned as the product of the state base rate and the case
orresponding relative weight.
In addition hospitals receive funds for capital invest-
ents from the Bundesländer (2.7 Billion Euros in 2013).
he proportion of this source of hospital income has been
eclining sharply [8] over time. It is likely that investments
re ﬁnanced via DRGs [9], but this aspect is hard to validate
r quantify. Institutionally Germany follows the principles
f a decentralized corporatist health system. This implies
hat self-governing bodies – namely, provider associations
nd sickness funds – are responsible for providing sub-
tantive detail to the provisions of the laws deﬁning the
ramework of hospital ﬁnancing.
. Health policy trends
With regard to DRG-based hospital payment mecha-
isms, three levels of policy-making are relevant in the
erman context: the federal-, the state- and on the local-
evel (i.e. individual hospital-level). The federal level is
ost relevant for the question how base rates are to be
hanged from one period to the next. The state- and the
ocal-level are relevant for the differentiation of base rates
y factors beyond patient characteristics.
.1. Annual change of DRG-based payments
Historically, the basis for hospital payment in Germany
ollowed a simple principle. The price had to be set so
hat the contribution rate – i.e. a percentage of the income
ach insuree has to pay to ﬁnance the SHI expenditures –
emains stable (all else equal) [10]. This principle was  trans-
ated directly into a mechanism to set a ceiling for annual
rice changes of hospitals, i.e. the overall relative change of
ontributions to SHI funds from one year to another deﬁned
he ceiling for price-change in the inpatient sector. This
price-change ceiling” was speciﬁed uniformly on the fed-
ral level and was binding for all price-negotiations. This
pproach was heavily criticized by hospital associations in
he aftermath of the introduction of the G-DRG system,
s in the new system deﬁned relative weights based on
etailed cost calculations, while the price ceiling of the
nnual change of DRG-based payments was affected solely
y the change in average income of social insurance funds
11].
The government responded by introducing the so-called
rankenhausﬁnanzierungsreformgesetz [12] in 2009. Thisalth Policy 119 (2015) 252–257 253
law mandated the German statistical ofﬁce to develop a
price-index based “orientation value” (Orientierungswert),
which was meant to capture a hospital speciﬁc inﬂation
rate rather than focusing on the change in the contrib-
utions of health insurance funds. The orientation-value is
the product of two  weighted sub-indices, which reﬂect
the major input categories of hospitals: labor and material
costs. Input price changes from the third and fourth quarter
of the previous year and the ﬁrst and second quarter of the
current year (compared with the corresponding previous
periods) are taken into account [13]. The law was meant to
signal to hospitals that in the context of the G-DRG system
not only relative weights of DRGs were to be deﬁned empir-
ically, but also the annual change of DRG-based payments
was meant to be to larger extent determined empirically
[12]. In the original framework the federal ministry of
health was meant to deﬁne the real price-ceiling for hos-
pitals, the so called change value (Veränderungswert), by
deciding to which extent the orientation value is to be
ﬁnanced. This approach would have established a consis-
tent pricing system whereby relative weights and annual
price changes are determined empirically—an approach
which is chosen in most DRG-based hospital payment sys-
tems [5].
However, the federal ministry of health never deﬁned
the price ceiling based on an empirically generated hos-
pital inﬂation rate and introduced yet another reform to
determine the price ceiling in mid-2012 [14]. The newly
established framework was operationalized as follows.
Corporatist bodies of self-government were mandated to
negotiate to what extent the measured price change is
meant to be reﬂected in the price ceiling. For the nego-
tiations between self-governing partners, the law deﬁned
different frameworks. Firstly, if the hospital speciﬁc inﬂa-
tion rate (“orientation value”) is below the average relative
change of contributions to SHI funds, the average relative
change of contributions to SHI funds automatically deter-
mines the “change value”. It hence becomes directly the
upper limit of hospital prices in the following period. Self-
governing partners have not to do much more than signing
the contracts—no real negotiations take place. Secondly, if
the orientation value is above the average relative change
of contributions to SHI funds, one third of the difference
between the two values constitutes a corridor for negotia-
tion between the self-governing partners (Fig. 1–ﬁrst part).
In case the partners of self-government cannot reach an
agreement on the price ceiling, a federal arbitration board
for the hospital sector decides. In this arbitration board
providers and sickness funds have equal votes, but an inde-
pendent chairs the board can vote with one of the sides to
enforce a decision.
In September 2012 the orientation-value was published
for the ﬁrst time (for 2013). With 2.0% it was below the
average relative change of contributions to SHI funds
(2.03%). There was therefore no need to negotiate and the
changevalue was automatically set at 2.0% in 2013. This
was, of course, not the kind of value the hospital associ-
ations had hoped for when arguing for a hospital speciﬁc
inﬂation rate as it was even lower than the reference value
that was applied before its introduction. As a consequence
hospital associations again massively lobbied for changing
254 U. Klein-Hitpaß, D. Scheller-Kreinsen / Health Policy 119 (2015) 252–257
rridor; SFig. 1. Change-value-co
the law in order to establish a more hospital-friendly
price-ceiling rule.
The government responded by introducing yet another
reform in mid-2013 [15]. With this reform the government
departed from its original policy paths to strengthen the
empirical basis of hospital ﬁnancing and its consistency.
Rather, it introduced an arbitrary framework that guaran-
tees that hospitals always take advantage from the more
beneﬁcial of the two policy approaches to deﬁne the ceiling
for the annual change in DRG-based hospital payments.
In the new framework, the following rules apply: if the
orientation value is lower than the average relative change
of contributions to SHI funds, the average relative change
of contributions to SHI funds determines the price-ceiling
(and not the lower orientation value as in 2013). Hence,
only if the hospital inﬂation rate is above the average rel-
ative change of contributions to SHI funds, it becomes
relevant for the deﬁnition of the price ceiling. Moreover
in 2014 and 2015, if the average relative change of contrib-
utions is lower than the orientation value, the negotiation
corridor for the change value was widened to the full delta
between the orientation value (Fig. 1–second part) and
the average relative change of contributions. In September
2013 the orientation-value was published for the second
time (for 2014). With 2.02% it was again below the aver-
age relative change of contributions to SHI funds (2.81%).
The change value was now, based on the new framework
automatically at 2.81% in 2014. For 2015 the orientation
value, with 1.44%, was again lower than the average rela-
tive change of contributions to SHI funds (2.53%). For 2015
the change value is automatically 2.53%.
Overall, the departure from the empirical policy track
resulted in additional hospital expenditure and annual
adjustments of DRG-based payments above the input-priceource: own illustration.
change. Multiplying the delta of the two rates with the total
DRG-related expenditure in 2013, which amounts to 65 bil-
lion Euros, the estimated additional expenditure amounts
to 500 Mio. Euros in 2014 and 700 Mio. Euros in 2015.
3.2. Differentiation of DRG-based hospital payments
Historically, hospital budgets and the prices for hospi-
tal services were negotiated locally between social health
insurance funds and providers. As a consequence the price
variation across hospitals was substantial. In the context
of the G-DRG introduction in 2004/5 hospital services
became transparent and comparable via uniform patient
classiﬁcation and product deﬁnition. As a consequence the
price differences across hospitals for similar services were
perceived increasingly “unfair” und arbitrary. The govern-
ment therefore introduced a series of reforms that were
meant to establish the principle that “the same prince is to
be paid for the same service”. Central point of the hospital
ﬁnancing laws that accompanied the G-DRG system intro-
duction was that path-dependent hospital speciﬁc prices
converged towards a state wide base rate (i.e. the “Landes-
basisfallwert”). Following the federal structure of Germany,
this approach implied that local hospital prices were meant
to converge towards16 state-wide base rates to be applied
to the hospitals in the respective state. In contrast to other
countries of comparable size, which differentiated base
rates on empirically observed cost differences [5], the Ger-
man  framework did foresee a quasi-market solution: i.e.
state base rates were negotiated between state-level asso-
ciations of providers and public health insurance funds.
The factors for these prospective negotiations are spec-
iﬁed by law in §  10 Abs. 3 Krankenhausentgeltgesetz:
the anticipated cost development of hospitals, structural
U. Klein-Hitpaß, D. Scheller-Kreinsen / Health Policy 119 (2015) 252–257 255
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Tig. 2. State base rates in 2014; Source: own illustration. Blue mark: Bun
nside  the price corridor. Red mark: Bundesland above the price corridor
eferred  to the web  version of this article. )
nefﬁciencies, the anticipated productivity development,
dditional volumes (to reﬂect economies of scale) or antic-
pated changes in the casemix to be provided. In this
ramework providers argued for a higher base rate given
ncreasing prices for inputs and the related cost increases.
ealth insurance funds on the other side concentrated on
roductivity gains and additional volumes as these reduced
he price across the board for all hospital services.
In 2009, when local hospital prices were fully converged
owards state speciﬁc base rates, these ranged from 2777
 to 3073 D across the German Bundesländer. Problem-
tic was that these remaining large price differences across
tates were still not informed by input price or cost differ-
nces, but the product of historical pricing patterns. This
erception was conﬁrmed by a large scale study commis-
ioned by the German Ministry of Health [9]. Arbitrary
rice variation based on geographical location led again to a
ounting pressure to reform the system. The government
eacted and initiated a second “convergence-phase” for the
ears 2010–2014, which was meant to converge state-level
rices into a narrow federal corridor [12]. The government
nce more aimed to thereby increase the homogeneity and
fairness” of price setting across German hospitals.
The effects and mechanisms of this second
onvergence-phase are complex and partially coun-
erintuitive. Starting in 2010 the self-governing partners of
he federal level annually had (and still have) to contract a
o-called “federal-reference-price” (Bundesbasisfallwert).
his reference value is generated taking the casemixer on the lower boundary of the price corridor. Grey mark: Bundesländer
terpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is
weighted average of all prices negotiated at the state-level
(previous year), adding the price ceiling of the following
year. Around the reference price a price corridor is deﬁned
(between 2.5 percent above and 1.5 percent below the
“federal-reference-price”) which sets boundaries for
state-level negotiations. In 2014 average state-level prices
adjusted by the “price ceiling” of 2.81 percent generate a
“federal-reference-price” of 3157 Euro. Consequently, the
corridor for state-level prices varies from 3236 Euro (+
2.5%) to 3117 Euro (− 1.25%). While the federal reference
price is calculated on the weighted state-baserates of
the previous year and pre-increased by the full price
ceiling, the federal price corridor sets limitations to the
(following) state price negotiations. In effect in nine of
the 16 states the base rates were directly determined by
the lower boundary of the price corridor in 2014 (Fig. 2).
As the price was set, only virtual negotiations (so called
Phantomverhandlungen) took place in these states, i.e.
there was no chance to negotiate a price under the lower
boundary of the corridor (which is determined by the
full price ceiling). Interesting is the obvious north–south
difference, which reﬂects historical price setting patterns.
As a result the regular mechanism to transform rela-
tive weights into actual DRG-based hospital payment, i.e.
state level negotiations, are by far outweighed by the deﬁ-
cient rules of convergence [16]. One consequence of this
pricing policy was  a constantly increasing hospital expen-
diture [17] and a level of service provision that is at the top
of table in international comparison [17,18].
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aymentFig. 3. The conversion of DRG-relative weights into hospital p
On the local level only mechanisms that relate to hos-
pital volumes are applied to differentiate prices. Most
important in this respect is that health insurance funds
and hospitals deﬁne in local negotiations the number
and the kind of services to be delivered in the upcoming
period. Base rate relevant in this context is that hospi-
tals face a price-reduction of 65 percent if they overrun
the prospectively agreed activity level (“Mehrerlösausgle-
ich”). In contrast, if a hospital provides services below
the prospectively agreed level, health insurance funds
will still pay 20 percent of the prospectively agreed sum
(“Mindererlösausgleich”). Both instruments imply that the
prospectively deﬁned activity is assessed against the in
reality delivered services. Secondly, the German govern-
ment responded to mounting cost containment pressure
in 2009 by introducing a so-called “additional-volume-
deduction” (“Mehrleistungsabschlag”). These deductions
are deﬁned by comparing the negotiated activity level of
period 0 to the negotiated activity-level of the upcom-
ing period 1. For this prospectively agreed activity
level increases prices are reduced by ﬁxed percentage.
Price deductions by the “additional-volume-deduction”
between 2009 and 2014 differed: 2009 (freely negotiated
on the local-level), 2011 (30%), 2012 (freely negotiated
on the local level), 2013 (25%) and 2014 (25% deduc-
tions that reduce prices for 2 years). Problematic is that
the additional-volume-deduction on the hospital level
(and not on the state or federal level) acts to preserve
existing hospital structures and thus reduces structural
changes and competition between hospitals [19]. Further-
more, additional payments and deductions for structural
factors or unavoidable costs are in principle foreseen
by the German hospital ﬁnancing law. However, the
respective rules and negotiations are so vague that in
practice they do not play a relevant role in hospital
ﬁnancing.: the federal-, state- and local-level; Source: own  illustration,
Fig. 3 illustrates and summarizes main levels, actors
and interactions of the conversion of relative weights
into actual DRG-based hospital payment. Overall, the
adjustments of the rules that affect the differentiation
of DRG-based hospital payment, which were originally
inspired by the idea to increase the fairness of hospital
payment, generated two  counterbalancing tendencies:
1. Centralization: i.e. convergence from state-level prices
towards a nationwide general price-level corridor.
2. Fragmentation and decentralization: i.e. price differen-
tiation on the hospital level, but only based on additional
volumes.
However, the complex and partially deﬁcient rules of
convergence towards a nationwide price corridor as well as
the narrow focus of local level price differentiation on addi-
tional volumes lead to the overwhelming perception that
DRG-based hospital payment has not become fairer and
more rational [19]. In contrast, the technical complexity
of hospital base rate deﬁnition over 10 years dramatically
increased, it has become increasingly political as the high
frequency of government interventions in DRG-based hos-
pital payment illustrates and is considered to fail to address
those factors, which may  legitimate base rate differentia-
tion based on organizational or regional factors [20].
4. Conclusion and outlook
The brief summary and analysis of recent reforms and
developments in the German DRG-based hospital payment
system illustrate that at least the German experience sug-
gests that addressing the annual adjustment of the price
ceiling in a DRG-based hospital payment algorithmically
on the basis of empirical data, rather than through gov-
ernment planning or corporatist negotiations can narrow
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he gap between cost and price development. In Germany
mpirical evidence is only used to determine the annual
rice-change ceiling, if it is favorable for hospitals. Pro-
ided that the empirically derived hospital inﬂation is not
avorable for hospitals, a different indicator, i.e. the average
nnual change of social health insurance income is applied.
his approach of preferential treatment maximization is
ighly costly.
Moreover in most DRG-based hospital payment systems
n empirical approach (e.g. input price indices or similar)
s used to scrutinize whether there are good reasons to dif-
er DRG-based hospital payments or base rates between
ospitals [5]. These may  include: (a) to keep certain hos-
itals in the market (as they are considered essential for
ccess to hospital services), (b) because certain providers
ace different unavoidable costs or (c) because providers
eliver different kinds of services (beyond those differences
aptured by the DRG system) [21] or (d) to account for dif-
erences in quality in hospital payment [22]. In Germany,
o far empirical evidence has not been used to motivate
he differentiation of DRG-based hospital payment due
o organizational, regional or state-level differences. In
ontrast empirical analyses suggested and motivated the
onvergence from state-level prices towards a nationwide
eneral price-level corridor. Though the intention of this
onvergence was increasing the transparency and fairness
f hospital payment, the rules and operationalization of
his convergence were highly problematic and undermined
egotiation mechanisms on the state level. As a result of
his convergence process neither a functional quasi-market
egotiation regime nor an empirically driven algorithmic
olution are in place to differentiate DRG-based hospital
ayments.
It remains to be seen whether the German approach
owards DRG-based hospital payment will revert towards
 functional quasi-market negotiation regime or will
hift towards a more algorithmic and empirically driven
pproach as practiced in England and the USA where
etailed price indices are applied for price differentiation.
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